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I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
This paper offers a historical account of the institutions of con-
trol of constitutionality in Peru. It is concerned primarily with the
constitutions and codes enacted during the post-Independence pe-
riod of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite the fact
that there is a long tradition of constitutional law studies in Peru,
this particular aspect of constitutional theory has received ex-
tremely scant attention. Therefore, this work may constitute the
first attempt to establish a systematic study of control of constitu-
tionality in Peru. The research undertaken thus far reveals that
in Peru such control has been undertaken both through the consti-
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at Duquesne University School of Law, Pittsburgh, PA, November 10-11, 2006.
** Professor, Catholic University of Peru, Lima.
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tutions themselves and through a form of judicial review. The
central aim of this account, therefore, is to bring into light this
unique aspect of Peru's constitutional theory.
The paper is structured chronologically. Its account begins with
the first Constitution enacted in 1823 and ends with the present
Constitution enacted in 1993. However, special attention is given
to the Civil Code of 1936, which instituted a form of judicial con-
trol of the constitutionality of laws similar to judicial review in the
American legal system. Although I will focus primarily on legal
norms, considerable attention will be given to the somewhat frag-
mentary doctrinal ideas regarding this institution, particularly in
the nineteenth century.
II. ATTEMPTS MADE AT A LEGISLATIVE LEVEL
As I have already mentioned, Peru proclaimed its political inde-
pendence from Spain in 1821, which, like Mexico's, was very late
compared to the independence of other countries of the Spanish
American world, such as Argentina in 1810, Venezuela in 1811,
Chile in 1816, and so on. The Argentinean General Jos6 de San
Martin proclaimed the Peruvian independence. He conducted a
successful military campaign liberating Argentina, Chile, and
then Peru, where he arrived with his troops in 1820.
It is worth having in mind various aspects of San Martin's cam-
paign. On the one hand, he did not have, from the logistic point of
view, the capacity to defeat the Spanish Army. On the other
hand, although he proclaimed political independence, he was not
really a Republican. Like many others at that time, he could not
resist the monarchic temptation (the ad hoc commission he ap-
pointed to find a European prince for Peru, a project that did not
have a happy ending, is well known). However, the arrival of
General Sim6n Bolivar's troops, which came successfully from Ca-
racas, changed San Martin's plans, because he alone could not
consolidate the independence he had proclaimed.
In fact, Bolivar had to finish in 1824 what San Martin had
started. He did it in the Ayacucho fields, an Andean city of Peru,
where he sealed, so to speak, the independence of Spanish Amer-
ica (leaving only the islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba and the Phil-
ippines in Asia, which all proclaimed independence in 1898).
But what happened at a legislative level during those years
when, despite periods of upheaval, several rules were sanctioned?
San Martin declared himself the Protector of Peru, and under
his protectorate was, as expected, some normative activity. But it
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was only provisional, as Peru was finishing the independence war.
Thus, the Provisional Regulation was issued on February 12,
1821, and the Provisional Statute on October 8, 1821. Both had
several provisions given during the war and validated the Spanish
legislation ruling in Peru, as long as it did not contradict the aims
of independence. Likewise, general laws were passed for the freed
areas as well, while the whole territory was not yet liberated.
Furthermore, some provisions were given for convening the Con-
stitutional Congress, an institution which, in October 1822, sanc-
tioned what was called the "Basis of the Peruvian Constitution."
It was a brief document approved by the Constitutional Congress
that included, in twenty-four points, the organic aspects and civil
rights on which Peru would be built. Therefore, Peru would defi-
nitely be a Republic and not a Monarchy as other people, not only
Peruvians but also foreigners, wanted. In fact, through a sui
generis process, Brazil proclaimed itself an Empire with the Lusi-
tanian royal household in 1822. It continued as an Empire until
1889 when it became a Republic.
However, none of these texts had anything related to the control
of constitutionality, not only because this matter was not dis-
cussed, but also because at that time, in the middle of a war, it
was not a matter of interest.
Nevertheless, it was addressed by the first Constitution, sanc-
tioned in 1823. Under the influence of the 1812 Cadiz Constitu-
tion (in which many Peruvians had taken part, some of them par-
ticipating in its debates), Article 90(1) of Peru's 1823 Constitution
included for the first time the so-called "political control" - i.e., a
control of constitutionality carried out by the Conservative Senate.
The Senate had to ensure, along with the Congress (Article 186),
the observance of the Constitution. This method was very well
used in most of the European Countries with parliamentary r6-
gimes during the whole nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth. But something amazing happened with this 1823
Constitution. It died the day it was born, as Professor Manuel
Vicente Villarin stated. It was solemnly approved on November
12, 1823, and was suspended the same day by the Constitutional
Congress, which in turn gave absolute power to Bolivar while fin-
ishing the war against the Spaniards. For this purpose, all the
powers were given to Bolivar as required by this delicate situa-
tion.
The end of the war took place in Ayacucho in December of 1824,
as was mentioned above. Afterwards, instead of handing over
command and abiding by the Constitution in force at that time,
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Bolivar devised a new, tailor-made Constitution in order to stay in
power. This Constitution was inspired by the 1799 French Consti-
tution. It had three Chambers instead of two and a life-long presi-
dency, which fell on Bolivar himself. This text, thought up and
written by Bolivar (known today due to the projects published),
was passed as the Constitution of the new Republic of Bolivia,
created under his defense and protection - although he did not
agree with the original idea of creating this new country. It was
later passed in 1826 as the Peruvian Constitution. Here we can
see Bolivar the legislator, with the creation of the constitutions of
Peru and Bolivia. The same text was also used for the Constitu-
tion of the Great Colombia (which included present-day Vene-
zuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador).
Thus, the 1826 Constitution was the second Peruvian constitu-
tion and was identified as Bolivarian, Bolivian, or the Life Consti-
tution. Under Article 51(1), the House of Censors had to ensure
the fulfillment of the Constitution by the government and to guard
against its violations. But the 1826 Constitution lasted a very
short time - no more than seven weeks in practice - and was
repealed six months later.
However, shortly before the electoral colleges approved the Life
Constitution, Bolivar had to leave Peru in an untimely manner to
go to the Great Colombia, where the internal problems and his
long absence had brought about a hostile and warlike environ-
ment that threatened his own position. He never came back to
Peru and died, disappointed, in 1830, in the Colombian town of
Santa Marta, as he was planning to travel to Europe.
In Bolivar's absence, the civil society, jaded by his authoritarian
projects, took advantage of this opportunity by declaring the Lib-
erator's powers concluded and making the Colombian troops re-
turn to their country.
We should keep in mind that although the formal independence
was in 1821, the practical independence was in 1824. Neverthe-
less, the execution of Ayacucho capitulation lasted two more years,
which explains why these first two Constitutions, from 1823 and
1826, did not have any effect at all.
The 1826 Constitution was somewhat exotic, as I have already
mentioned. Regarding the matter of our concern, it repeated the
same concepts as its predecessor, involving the political model of
control, which did not have any application.
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III. THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE STEPS
In 1827, when the territory was actually liberated of every for-
eign military force, friendly or unfriendly, Peru started to institu-
tionally organize. During that period, a new Constitutional Con-
gress discussed and approved the 1828 Constitution, which, due to
its structure, subject matter and influence, would be very impor-
tant for the Peruvian historical-political future. This is the reason
why Professor Villardn called it, fairly, the mother of all our con-
stitutions, since it laid the foundations for everything that came
afterwards. Moreover, it established a five-year time period for a
complete review of the Constitution, which was done within the
specified period, approving a new Constitution in 1834. The 1828
Constitution created, in Article 92, the State Council, comprised of
ten senators elected by both Chambers and functioning only dur-
ing congressional recess. One of its functions was to ensure con-
stitutional observance (Article 94, 1), independent of the power of
impeachment, which could be initiated for the same purposes by
each Chamber separately. Likewise, Congress evaluated viola-
tions against the Constitution immediately after its session open-
ing (Article 173).
It is worth having in mind that constitutional observance and
constitutional violations, concepts appearing in the first Peruvian
constitutions and repeated in the subsequent ones, came from the
1812 Spanish model of Cadiz and referred to observances and con-
trols of acts or facts as opposed to laws, for they, being an expres-
sion of the legislative body, had legitimacy given by the vote.
But, although there is not a specific norm saying so, the 1828
Constitution - as well as the ones following it in the nineteenth
century - implicitly contained the idea of normative hierarchy,
i.e., that the Constitution is supreme, followed by laws and regula-
tions, and then a number of provisions.
The 1828 Constitution was replaced in 1834 by a Constitution
that continued political control by the State Council (Article 96),
which was comprised of two advisors who represented each one of
the provinces or regions and were elected by the Congress. This
time the Council had more powers; one of which was to ensure
observance of both the Constitution and the law. As in the 1828
Constitution, Article 103 provided that its powers were only con-
sultative and so were its decisions. Article 165, repeating previous
texts, stipulated that every Peruvian citizen could claim constitu-
tional violations before Congress or the Executive. It was under-
Spring 2007
Duquesne Law Review
stood in both cases that only acts or facts, not regulations, could be
challenged on constitutional grounds.
This 1834 Constitution did not last. Afterwards, the Peru-
Bolivian Confederation, a real two-state federation, was created in
1836. It lasted a very short time, and after the collapse of the
Confederation in 1839, a new Constitution was necessary, and it
was accomplished in 1839. The new body of law was an authori-
tarian Constitution that maintained the State Council (Article 96).
But, regarding constitutional observance, it was in effect longer
and was actually activated, having the power to ask for reports
and to demand responsibilities.
The 1839 Constitution was followed by the Constitution of 1856,
which brought a new approach to the subject.
IV. THE 1856 CONSTITUTION
The 1856 Constitution contained the following two aspects: (1)
Article 10, whiich first stipulated that "any law opposed to the
Constitution is null and void," and then added that "the acts of the
people usurping public functions are also null"; and (2) the dis-
missal of the State Council, leaving up in the air everything con-
cerning constitutional observance.
Although this measure was new in Peru, the doctrine itself was
not - not even in the positive Constitutional Law of other Span-
ish-American republics. Thus, the 1811 Venezuelan Constitution,
which could be considered the first constitution of the recently in-
dependent Spanish-American world, contained a similar measure
in its Article 227, which stipulated the following:
The present Constitution, the laws issued in consequence to
execute it, and all treaties terminated under the authority of
the Union Government, shall be the supreme law of the Land
... but the laws issued against its tenor shall not have any
value ....
Similar measures could be found in other constitutional texts of
that time.
Now, is the mere solemn declaration of such an important prin-
ciple sufficient to ensure the existence of a real and concrete con-
trol of constitutionality?
Some scholars, delighted with the declarations appearing in the
nineteenth-century Latin American constitutions - as the one I
have quoted - concluded, hurriedly in my opinion, that declaring
that unconstitutional regulations will be punished and that laws
582 Vol. 45
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transgressing the Constitution will be nullified is, alone, sufficient
proof of the existence of the control of constitutionality.
I do not share this view. We perfectly know that there is, on the
one hand, the substantive concept behind the declarations and
principles; on the other hand, there must be instruments in place
to make those concepts a reality. They are two sides of the same
coin, complementary and independent. One could exist without
the other. The eighteenth-century French revolutionaries had
been wrong, because they believed that the human rights declara-
tion alone was sufficient to ensure its real and effective fulfill-
ment.
In reality, the declarations are important, but not sufficient.
They themselves do not guarantee anything. They could be con-
vincing, but if they do not have the procedural instruments for
their fulfillment, they will not be achieved.
Therefore, Article 10 of the 1856 Constitution, although signifi-
cant, was a solemn declaration only on paper, for no developmen-
tal or complementary law was issued to make it effective.
At that time, Mexico had declared similar rights and constitu-
tional supremacy in its constitutions, but only when the "Amparo"
was created in 1841 and ratified in 1847 did it have the structural
institutions needed to realize these kinds of aspirations.
V. THE 1860 CONSTITUTION
The 1860 Constitution, which lasted from 1860 to 1920, re-
moved the State Council, which had been gradually diminished in
the previous texts. Instead of the State Council, Article 105 estab-
lished the Permanent Committee, which, among other powers,
had authority to ensure compliance with the Constitution. This
was the only reference to control of constitutionality, albeit only
political, that was shown at that time by the text. However, the
Permanent Committee did not last long. An 1874 constitutional
reform removed it, and it was never reinstated.
Nevertheless, among the Congress' powers in Article 59, 4 was
the authority:
to examine preferably the violations of the Constitution and
arrange what is considered advisable to make effective the li-
abilities of the offenders.
This precept confirmed the political control, and it would be re-
peated in subsequent texts.
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VI. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE 1920 AND 1933
CONSTITUTIONS
The first two twentieth-century constitutions, from 1920 and
1933, followed the same tendency. They assigned to Congress the
task of dealing with constitutional violations, but they did not cre-
ate any control system.
However, it should be pointed out that, when the Constitution
was debated in 1919, a parliamentary committee chaired by Javier
Prado, a senator from Lima, proposed to introduce the jurisdic-
tional control of constitutionality of laws carried out by the Su-
preme Court. This proposal never prospered.
The same proposal was made while debating the 1933 Constitu-
tion. The ad hoc Committee chaired by Professor Manuel Vicente
Villardn to write a draft of the Constitution had the same point of
view. But the project regarding this subject was not approved ei-
ther.
Nevertheless, we should emphasize that the 1920 Constitution
re-introduced the State Council in Article 134, which would be
composed of seven members appointed by the vote of the cabinet
and approved by the Senate. It would only be consultative, even
though by law it could be given the veto power for certain affairs.
Law number 4042 from January 31, 1920, stated the council's
functions would be almost all administrative and consultative.
However, the government eventually became an authoritarian
regime, in power for ten years, and the State Council did not work
as its members were never appointed. It has never been present
in later Peruvian constitutional texts, and finally disappeared.
VII. DOCTRINE ON THIS SUBJECT
When Peru declared independence in 1821, it was done in a very
precarious state, for the war continued and the young republic
continued to struggle under the shadow of political leaders for sev-
eral decades.
Nevertheless, we should have in mind that the old University of
San Marcos, founded in May 1551, was still working. All leaders
and actors in favor of the independence had graduated from the
University, and therefore, there was a long tradition of education.
This explains why, in 1826, lawyer Antonio Amezaga was ap-
pointed to teach a new course in Constitutional Public Law at the
law school. He was practically unknown, except for his relation-
ship with some outstanding men of those times.
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Curiously, in 1827, the Lecciones de Derecho Pziblico Consti-
tucional (Lessons on Constitutional Public Law) by Ram6n de
Salas, a professor in Salamanca, was printed in Lima, probably
without the author's authorization or knowledge. The Lessons
had been published in two volumes in 1821 in Spain as a presen-
tation and general comment on the 1812 Spanish Constitution.
This book appears to be the first manual generally used by stu-
dents at that time, although we should not discount other read-
ings of the Enlightenment then in circulation in their original lan-
guages of English and French. Likewise, it was the first book
about the constitutional subject printed in the independent Peru.
Salas's book, however, did not deal with the subject of control of
constitutionality, which was perfectly explainable at that time.
The subject was mentioned only in passing when talking about the
Conservative Power.
Years later, a translation from French of the Compendio de De-
recho Publico Interno y Externo (Compendium on Internal and Ex-
ternal Public Law) by the Portuguese Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira
was published. The translation was made by Bartolom6 Herrera,
and it had long notes written by him. This book would have great
importance with the passing of time and had great influence. Its
first edition is from 1848, and the second, which was practically
just like the first, has no date, but it is likely to be from the 1860s
according to the information we have.
This translated text and the notes that Bartolom6 Herrera
wrote in it, which were as lengthy as the book commented, had no
direct reference to the control of constitutionality, even though it
was implicitly mentioned. Both authors supported the thesis of
the so-called "Conservative Power," created years before by Ben-
jamin Constant in France.
Around that time, Felipe Masias published in 1855 his Breves
Nociones de la Ciencia Constitucional (Brief Notions on Constitu-
tional Science), which would have a second edition in 1860. This
was the first textbook presented on this discipline in an organic
and complete way. Here, the author makes a statement about the
control of constitutionality to be carried out by the Judiciary, a
proposal known as the American model.
Soon afterwards, Jos6 Silva Santisteban published his book en-
titled Curso de Derecho Constitucional (Course of Constitutional
Law), whose first edition was released in 1856. It did not say any-
thing new. The same happened with the second edition in 1859
and with the third, very expanded version of 1874.
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Another book, written by Luis Felipe Villardn, was very impor-
tant due to its great influence as a university text book for more
than twenty years. It was entitled Comentarios a la Constituci6n
peruana (Commentaries of the Peruvian Constitution) and only
had one edition, published in 1899. Villardn was cautious about
this problem and had serious doubts about the constitutional con-
trol being carried out by the Judiciary. In any case, he was reluc-
tant about this institution.
Manuel Vicente Villardn, son of Luis Felipe Villarin, who was
also a university professor, was a resolute supporter of the Judici-
ary, as demonstrated by his university lessons from 1915 to 1916.
Those lessons were widely circulated during that time, even
though they were published decades later after his death. His
thesis was included in the constitutional draft presented in 1931,
as shall be mentioned below.
VIII. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
During the nineteenth century, the control of constitutionality
was not seen in Peru. But it was considered by other Latin
American countries (such as Mexico since 1841 and Argentina
since 1868), and it was widely known as the doctrine contained in
The Federalist and in the classical book of de Tocqueville on de-
mocracy in America.
Furthermore, the only time the principle was expressly embod-
ied in 1856 was in a brief enunciation, which required a proce-
dural development that was never carried out. Therefore, it made
the principle completely ineffective. The enunciation of the 1856
Constitution served only to justify revolutions and uprisings
against the constitutional power of the government, which is why
the text was removed when debating the 1860 Constitution.
The same could be said about the doctrine, which was sparing in
that sense. The experience of the State Council in the period of
1839-1855, which would never be repeated, was interesting, but
was not of a judicial nature. In a few words: the nineteenth cen-
tury practically ignored judicial review.
IX. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
We shall highlight some interesting events that happened at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The first is the verdict of the
Supreme Court from August 1920 according to Public Prosecutor
Guillermo Seoane's opinion. The highest tribunal held not only
that the Constitution was the maximum regulation of the juridical
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organization which no law could contradict, but also that the Judi-
ciary must declare the supremacy of the Constitution over all the
other regulations.
This Judicial supreme decision is, as far as we know, the first
case of unconstitutionality known by the Peruvian Judiciary. It
declared the inapplicability of a law, even though it was not very
clear in the enunciation. This case, which apparently did not have
any precedent, was important, but unfortunately, it was not fol-
lowed up, did not awaken a favorable current of opinion toward
the decision, and did not motivate the appearance of a new judicial
statement. On the contrary, this trend was abandoned for many
decades until the environment changed, as we will see below.
Simultaneous to this judicial decision, as I have already men-
tioned, there was the Constitutional Reform Project, which set up
a parliamentary committee in 1919, chaired by Javier Prado. It
clearly proposed to give the Supreme Court the power to declare
the unconstitutionality of laws. The Project made the proposal
official and gave rise to the constitutional doctrine of subsequent
years. Unfortunately, although the Project proposed by Prado's
Committee was submitted to the plenary session of the National
Assembly, it was never discussed. A review of the "Congressional
Records" of that time shows that the text on control of constitu-
tionality was not debated in the plenary, because Prado himself,
who was a senator from Lima, removed it from the project for un-
known reasons. It was likely due to commitments or political
pressures of that time, which would be understandable consider-
ing that the just-initiated regime had hardened its repressive pol-
icy of fundamental freedoms. The reason why Prado, a gifted and
very prestigious man, agreed to withdraw the project is unknown
because he died tragically a few months later in 1921.
X. THE FIRST STEP: THE CIVIL CODE PROJECT OF 1923
It is clear that the control of constitutionality of laws became a
subject of public debate, at least in the academic environment,
after it was incorporated in the draft of the 1920 Constitution.
This explains why the topic was present in the Civil Code Reform-
ing Commission, appointed by the Government in 1922. This
Commission's aim was to reform the 1852 Civil Code in force at
that time.
The published written records show that this subject was ad-
dressed some time after the Commission's settlement, and it was
intended to be incorporated into the Civil Code. At that time, they
Spring 2007
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believed that this idea could be valid, as the Civil Code contained
the basic principles of the juridical system.
It was intended to incorporate a provision of a public nature into
the Preliminary Title of the Code's draft under discussion. Never-
theless, in order to do that, they decided to discuss it with three
personalities through a letter dated May 5, 1923. The three cho-
sen persons were the following: Anselmo G. Barreto, a distin-
guished judge who was president of the Supreme Court; Eleodoro
Romero, a university professor and a very prestigious attorney;
and Manuel Vicente Villardn, former President of the Lima Bar
Association and former President of the University of San Marcos.
Without any doubt, these were the best constitutionalists of that
time. Of the three persons consulted, only Barreto positively an-
swered the inquiry in writing. It is unknown what happened with
the other two. The proposal to introduce judicial control was ap-
proved by the Reforming Commission in its February 28, 1923 ses-
sion.
XI. THE 1936 CIVIL CODE AND THE CONTROL OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The project on the new Civil Code was finished in 1928. The
Commission's president, Juan Jos6 Calle, a distinguished judge of
the Supreme Court, died in 1929, motivating the Commission to
go into recess.
However, years later in 1936, it was taken up again, and the
Civil Code was thus enacted. It was included in article XXII of its
Preliminary Title, which literally said "[i]f there is incompatibility
between a constitutional provision and a legal provision, the for-
mer shall prevail."
Constitutional scholars welcomed this contribution, and we
could see it, for instance, in Comentarios al C6digo Civil Peruano
(Commentaries on the Peruvian Civil Code) by Jose Le6n Baran-
diardn in volume IV, which appeared in Lima in 1952. Regarding
the constitutional doctrine, the book Comentarios a la Consti-
tuci6n Nacional (Commentaries on the National Constitution),
published in Lima in 1939 by Jos6 Pareja Paz-Soldin, stood out.
On page 134, the following was stipulated:
The principle of not enforcing unconstitutional laws consti-
tutes an indispensable complement to the Judiciary .... It
represents an advance in the Republic's institutional life, one
of the phenomena of the trend to power rationalization and an
588 Vol. 45
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opportune defense of constitutional principles and regula-
tions.
Therefore, these regulations were well received by both the pri-
vate law experts and the constitutionalists. Nevertheless, the po-
litical environment did not value the principle, and it was not de-
veloped by the legislation or the tribunals' decisions.
XII. THE HARD WAY OF THE 1936 CIVIL CODE
However, some cases of control of constitutionality arose during
those years. Only very few among them were interesting. Iso-
lated cases tried to apply the control of constitutionality, but this
was not the general tendency. On different occasions from 1948-
1956 it was actually asserted that article XXII of the Preliminary
Title of the Civil Code was too general, that it had not been devel-
oped, and that, in any case, it was only to be applied in the private
sphere and not in the public, since it was framed within a Civil
Code. That is to say, regulations sanctioned by the Legislature
could not be invalidated with such an article.
Nevertheless, what calls our attention even more is that in the
opening speech of the judicial year 1956-1957, the president of the
Supreme Court, Mr. Carlos Sayin Alvarez, defended this stance.
He said that the principle contained in the Civil Code could not be
applied, for it had not been appropriately developed. Further-
more, he stated that the Judiciary should only enforce laws and
not avoid its applications, because it would represent a usurpation
of functions to which the Judiciary had not been authorized by
anyone. Finally, he invoked the Congress to sanction a law allow-
ing judges to exercise diffused control.
A democratic government began in July of 1956, which left be-
hind the hard times through which the country had passed from
1948-1956, and allowed a better exchange of ideas. An important
debate was organized at a national level, involving the entire Ju-
ridical Community, including attorneys, Professors of Law, etc. It
is worth mentioning that at this point the majority of attorneys
supported what is called the diffuse method or American control,
i.e., a control exercised by the Judiciary. This is how the subject
was considered in the events organized by the Lima Bar Associa-
tion in 1960 and 1961.
Around that time, in the opening of the 1959 judicial year, the
new president of the Supreme Court, Ricardo Bustamante
Cisneros, held in a fundamental speech that a control of constitu-
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tionality of laws was needed and that such control had to be exer-
cised through the Judiciary. Soon afterwards, a Commission ap-
pointed by the government drew up a project of the Organic Law
for the Judiciary, which was surprisingly sanctioned by the de
facto government. The project lasted a year, from 1962-1963, and
it was a work prepared by top-level people. Such Organic Law, in
no. 14, 506, included the following paragraphs:
Article 8. - If judges and tribunals, when hearing any kind of
trials, find that there is incompatibility between a constitu-
tional provision and a legal provision, the former shall pre-
vail.
(a) If the judicial decisions of first instance where this precept
is applied are not appealed, they shall be taken to the First
Chamber of the Supreme Court.
(b) The judicial decisions of second instance shall be taken to
the First Chamber of the Supreme Court if an appeal has not
been filed.
Therefore, this was how the principle of control of constitution-
ality of laws was clearly incorporated in a highly detailed manner
and applied during the 1963-1968 period.
A new coup d'etat took place in 1968 and established a military
junta for twelve years from 1968 to 1980. In spite of this, when
the military's political project was exhausted, it agreed with the
political parties to return to the democratic life. So, a schedule to
convene a general election in 1980 (which was indeed done) was
made, but before then, a Constitutional Convention had to be
called and a new constitution approved.
The importance of the 1979 Constitution is that, for the first
time, a system of constitutional control at the highest level was
formalized, taking advantage, in part, of the Peruvian experience
over the years, but also incorporating some aspects of contempo-
rary European constitutional law, as we shall see below.
XIII. THE 1979 CONSTITUTION
1968 began a long period of military government in Peru which
lasted twelve years - the longest of our history. During that
time, many things were carried out, some of them very debatable
and others not. But above all, the military elite had thought, from
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the first moment, that the country needed a new Constitution
more appropriate for the time.
In fact, a review of the nineteenth-century Peruvian Constitu-
tions and the first twentieth century ones, especially the 1920 and
1933 Constitutions, confirms that all of them were alike, which
was understandable at that time. But in 1968, mainly after the
Second World War, constitutionalism was very different.
Therefore, after making an agreement with political parties, a
plural and democratic Constitutional Convention was called. It
worked one year, from July 1978 to July 1979, after which a new
Constitution, which brought new ideas compared with the previ-
ous constitutions, was approved.
This text was a model that laid the guidelines for what came af-
terwards. It included two control systems, both diffuse, which
came from the past tradition, and the concentrated system, which
was adopted by the 1979 Constitution according to the European
model.
Thus, such text conferred to the Judiciary in Article 234 the
power to declare the inapplicability of unconstitutional laws in
various proceedings. This formalized the highest normative level
of the diffuse control which, first incorporated in 1936, had ups
and downs and was applied only to cases and controversies.
In addition, it created the Court of Constitutional Guarantees as
a concentrated control organ, independent and separated from the
Judiciary, which had few powers. Its most important function was
to analyze through an abstract and general proceeding unconstitu-
tional laws and to remove them, having erga omnes, or general,
effects.
Curiously, within the Peruvian juridical organization, the two
systems were made to coexist, without being mixed; therefore, de-
scribing it as a mixed system, as has been done, does not do justice
to what is really in existence. I have actually dared to think that
it is a dual or parallel system, a connotation that explains more
clearly how it works compared to the previous Constitution.
XIV. THE 1993 CONSTITUTION
After the 1992 coup d'etat carried out by president Fujimori
with the support of the armed forces, a Constitutional Congress
was convened, and in 1993 it approved a new Constitution. This




Regarding the judicial review problem, the model was slightly
expanded and some amendments were introduced, but it was es-
sentially the same. Thus, there was established:
(a) A judicial review only for concrete cases before the Judiciary
having special characteristics, i.e., only for parties involved in an
action. This power can be exercised by any judge, which is known
as diffused control.
(b) An abstract process, of a general nature, carried out through
the so-called "unconstitutionality process," which is an exclusive
competence of the Constitutional Court, the new name of the insti-
tution replacing the previous Court of Constitutional Guarantees.
During the long period Fujimori was President (1990-2000),
there was a restricted exercise of the diffused control, under the
authority of the Judiciary, and the abstract control, under the ex-
clusive authority of the Constitutional Court, with no serious con-
sequences.
Subsequently, after Fujimori collapsed in November 2000, a
transition period began. Elections were convened in 2001 and also
in 2006. We can see that the continuity of democratic govern-
ments has been established. Likewise, this has allowed both the
Judiciary and the Constitutional Court to act more freely.
The Constitutional Court has undoubtedly been most active in
this field, using the European model based on the Austrian ex-
perience. It has played an active and interesting role with its de-
cisions, although it has made some significant excesses and com-
mitted some mistakes, which have been criticized by both the pub-
lic opinion and the specialized juridical sphere. But, we have to
accept that the final evaluation of their work has been positive.
XV. CONCLUSION
If we analyze. the constitutional regulations of Spanish-
American countries, we can see that all of them had a great
American influence on Public Law. Several countries contributed
some interesting innovations, such as Mexico, Brazil, Colombia,
Venezuela and Argentina in the nineteenth century, and Cuba in
the first half of the twentieth century before Castro.
Peru, on the contrary, was slow in establishing a control system,
which, although suggested by several jurists, was not established
at a positive level until 1936 in the Preliminary Title of the Civil
Code and in the so-called "American control System."
At a constitutional level, control was accomplished for the first
time in the 1979 Constitution, which involved both the diffuse and
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the concentrated methods of control, putting an ad hoc Tribunal in
charge of executing the latter.
The 1993 Constitution is currently in force. Although different
from the previous Constitution with regard to its economic chap-
ter, it does not differ on the subject of control of constitutionality.
It generally repeats the 1979 Constitution's framework with some
refining (it includes the Constitutional Court with that name and
increases some of its powers). Most likely, the constitutional re-
form in progress will only reiterate what exists at the moment.
Regarding the legal effect of such controls, they have mainly op-
erated during democratic periods, especially during the 1963-1968
period and the 1980-1992 period as well. In 1992, Fujimori's coup
d'etat changed the situation because an authoritarian regime was
installed. In 2000, this regime collapsed and a democratic recu-




In Peru, the subject of control of constitutionality and its origins
has not been studied in an organic way, and practically there is
not any detailed research on this subject. This forces us to deal
with a large number of unfocused documents. For a general
view we could point out the following: Domingo Garcia Belaunde,
La jurisdicci6n constitucional en el Perd (The constitutional juris-
diction in Peru), "Revista de la Universidad Cat6lica" (Lima), No.
3, May 1978; Carlos E. Becerra Palomino, Antecedentes sobre la
jurisdicci6n constitucional en el Perd (History of the constitutional
jurisdiction in Peru), "Notarius", II, No. 2, 1991, and Ernesto
Blume Fortini, El Tribunal Constitucional peruano como supremo
intirprete de la Constituci6n (The Peruvian Constitutional Court
as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution), "Pensamiento
constitucional" (Constitutional Thought), No. 3, 1996.
The constitutional texts can be found in Jos6 Pareja Paz-
Sold in, Las constituciones del Perd (The Peruvian Constitutions),
Ed. Cultura Hispdinica, Madrid, 1954, and Domingo Garcia Be-
launde, Las Constituciones del Perd (The Peruvian Constitutions),
publications of the Ministry of Justice, Lima, 1992; 2d edition, re-
vised and expanded in 2006 and published in two volumes under
the Fondo Editorial de la Universidad San Martin de Porres. Re-
garding the Constitution currently in force, cf. Domingo Garcia
Belaunde and Francisco Fernandez Segado, La Constituci6n peru-
ana de 1993 (The 1993 Peruvian Constitution), Ed. Grijley, Lima,
1994 and Victor Garcia Toma, Andlisis sistemdtico de la Consti-
tuci6n peruana de 1993 (Systematic Analysis of the 1993 Peruvian
Constitution), Fondo Editorial de la Universidad de Lima, two vol-
umes, Lima, 1998.
For information about the State Council, focusing on its most
active and significant period, there are numerous documents of
that time, cf. Daniel Soria Lujdn, Los mecanismos iniciales de de-
fensa de la Constituci6n en el Perd: el poder conservador y el Con-
sejo de Estado: (1839-1855) (The initial defense mechanisms of the
Peruvian Constitution: the conservative power and the State
Council (1839-1855)); thesis to obtaining the lawyer degree in the
Universidad Cat6lica dated October 2d, 1997; its summary can be
found in "Pensamiento constitucional" (Constitutional Thought),
No. 5, 1988.
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The main nineteenth-century doctrinaire texts are the fol-
lowing: the book by Ram6n de Salas, originally published in two
volumes in Madrid in 1821, was reproduced in Lima, and has the
following book card: Lecciones de Derecho Pdblico Constitucional
(Lessons on Constitutional Public Law), Imp. Republicana de Jos6
Maria Concha, two volumes, Lima, 1827, 247 pages. Regarding
the Peruvian edition of Salas's book, refer to Edgar Carpio Mar-
cos's essay, El primer libro de Derecho Constitucional publicado en
el Perd (The first book on Constitutional Law published in Peru),
included as an appendix in Javier Tajadura Tejada's book, "El De-
recho Constitucional y su ensefianza" (Constitutional Law and its
teaching), Ed Grijley, Lima, 2001.
Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira's book was published in 1848
and has the following card: Compendio de Derecho Puiblico Interno
y Externo (Compendium on Internal and External Public Law),
notes and translation by Bartolom6 Herrera for the use of the San
Carlos School, Printer's of the School, Lima, 1848. A second edi-
tion, without date, but probably from 1860, was published shortly
afterwards, without changing the text, but with different cases.
Already started the twentieth century, Jorge Guillermo Leguia
reproduced it in the "Biblioteca de la Repiiblica" (Library of the
Republic) along with other Herrera works, and under the general
title Escritos y discursos (Writings and Speeches), Ed Rosay, two
volumes, Lima, 1929-1934. Among the numerous sources that can
referenced about Herrera, for its compendious nature, see Agustin
de Asis, Bartolom6 Herrera, pensador politico (Bartolom6 Herrera:
political thinker), Sevilla, 1954. Likewise, refer to Silvestre Pin-
heiro Ferreira (1769-1846), Bibliografia y estudios criticos (Critical
Bibliography and Studies), Centro de Documentacho do
pensamento brasileiro, Bahia, 1983. Pinheiro, born in Lisboa, had
an agitated life and published mainly in French, including the
Prdcis in 1830, which is translated by Herrera.
Felipe Masias published the first, although small, text book on
constitutional law. He did so in 1855, cf. Breves nociones de la
Ciencia Constitucional (Brief notions of Constitutional Science),
Lima, 1855, which has as an appendix a selection of Ahrens,
probably translated from French by himself. He published a sec-
ond edition in 1860, but without the appendix of Ahrens. Masias




Jos6 Silva Santisteban published many books about the most
diverse subjects; concerning judicial review cf. Curso de Derecho
Constitucional (Course of Constitutional Law), which appeared for
the first time in 1856, dedicated to the young liberal Emilio Caste-
lar. It seems they met during one of his trips to Spain. A second
edition was published in 1859, and the third one in 1874, which
has the following book card: Curso de Derecho Constitucional
(Course on Constitutional Law), Lib. de A. Bouret and son, 3rd
edition, Paris, 1874. Silva Santisteban died in 1889, but his heirs
published two more editions in Paris in 1891 and 1914, which
have been called the 4th and 5th edition, respectively. But, these
two last editions are only reprints of the 1874 3rd edition, which,
therefore, has to be considered the definitive one.
Luis Felipe Villaran published several texts which were
summarized at the end of his life in one text entitled La Consti-
tuci6n peruana comentada (Commentaries of the Peruvian Consti-
tution), E. Moreno editor, Lima, 1899, and was the only reference
book until the beginning of the twentieth century. Manuel
Vicente VillarAn, replaced L. F. Villardn as professor in the uni-
versity chair, has numerous texts and some Lessons on Constitu-
tional Law from the 1915-1916 period; they were widely circu-
lated, but have only been reprinted many years afterwards (I was
in charge of it and it was carried out within the Fondo Editorial de
la Universidad Cat6lica in 1998).
Regarding the 1856 Constitution, there are almost no com-
ments because it lasted a very short time. However there is a
highly favorable opinion on it relating to article 10: Toribio
Pacheco, Tratado de Derecho Civil (Civil Law Treaty), Govern-
ment Printer, vol. I, Lima, 1872 (the first edition is from 1860).
The parliamentary debates to set aside the famous article 10
of the 1856 Constitution can be seen in the Diario de los Debates
del Congreso reunido en 1860 (Congressional Records gathered in
1860), Tip. del Comercio, Lima, 1860, pp. 170 foll.
Regarding the 1920 Constitution, cf. Toribio Alayza y Paz-
Solddn, Derecho Constitucional General y del Peri (Peruvian and
General Constitutional Law), Imp. Cervantes, Lima, 1928; and
Graham H. Stuart, Governmental system of Peru, Carnegie Insti-
tution, Washington, 1925. Regarding the 1933 Constitution, cf.
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Toribio Alayza y Paz-Soldin, Derecho Constitucional del Peru' y
leyes orgdnicas de la Reptiblica (The Peruvian Constitutional Law
and organic laws of the Republic), Imp. Sanmarti, Lima 1934; and
Jos6 Pareja Paz-Soldgn, Comentarios a la Constituci6n nacional
(Commentaries on the National Constitution), Talleres Graf. del
Hosp. Victor Larco Herrera, Lima, 1939. With additions and up-
dates, Pareja himself subsequently published the same work un-
der the title Derecho Constitucional Peruano (Peruvian Constitu-
tional Law), Ed Lumen, Lima, 1951, which has had numerous edi-
tions and had an enormous influence during the subsequent dec-
ades.
Regarding the 1979 Constitution, cf. Jos6 Pareja Paz-Solddn,
Derecho Constitucional Peruano y la Constituci6n de 1979 (Peru-
vian Constitutional Law and the 1979 Constitution), Ed Justo
Valenzuela, 3rd ed., Lima, 1984, with reprints.
And about the 1993 Constitution currently in force, cf. Enri-
que Bernales Ballesteros, La Constituci6n de 1993 (The 1993 Con-
stitution), in collaboration with Alberto Otgrola, 5th ed., Ed Rao,
Lima, 1999; Marcial Rubio Correa, Estudio de la Constituci6n
Politica de 1993 (Research on the 1993 Political Constitution),
Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Cat6lica, six volumes, Lima,
1999, and the already-quoted work of Victor Garcia Toma.
Regarding the projects, cf. Proyecto de reforma de la Constitu-
ci6n del Perd presentado por la Comisi6n de Constituci6n (Peru-
vian Constitutional Reform Project presented by the Constitutio-
nal Committee), official edition, Lima, 1919, and Anteproyecto de
Constituci6n politica del Estado (The State Political Constitution
Draft), Imp. Torres Aguirre, Lima, 1933 (this is the one prepared
by the ad hoc Commission chaired by Villarin).
On the history and debates of the 1936 Civil Code, see Peru-
vian Civil Code Reforming Committee, Actas de las sesiones (Re-
cords on the Sessions), Imp. Castrill6n, Lima, 1928, vol. I, as well
as Consultas de la Comisi6n Reformadora del C6digo Civil y re-
spuestas que ha recibido (Enquiries of the Civil Code Reforming
Committee and the replies received), Imp. Gil, Lima, 1926. The
advances approved by the Reforming Committee can be found in
Juan Jos6 Calle, C6digo Civil del Perd (Peruvian Civil Code), Imp.
Gil. Lima, 1928. This book includes the Civil Code in force in
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1852, reporting the advances that would be incorporated in the
code.
Regarding the legislative movement of the 1960s, refer to,
among others, Ernesto Perla Velaochaga, La nueva Ley Orgdnica
del Poder Judicial (The new Organic Law of the Judiciary), in
"Derecho" (Law), no. XIX, 1963.
For general bibliography cf. Helen L. Clagett, A guide to the
law and legal literature of Peru, The Library of Congress, Wash-
ington, 1947 2d ed. 1971, and Domingo Garcia Belaunde, Guia
bibliogrdfica de Derecho Constitucional Peruano (Bibliographic
guidebook to Peruvian Constitutional Law), in "Derecho" (Law),
no. 29, Lima, 1971.
For the procedural point of view, see Luis Castillo C6rdova,
Comentarios al C6digo Procesal Constitucional (Commentaries on
the Constitutional Procedural Code), Ed. Palestra, two volumes,
Lima 2006.
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